

Cd/Fd

5 July 1957

Copy No. 136

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 4  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. X  
IT DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 4-1-80 REVIEWER:

## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003200040001-1

Approved For Release 2002/07/30 : CIA-RDP79T00975A003200040001-1

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## CONTENTS

1. ELEVATION OF MARSHAL ZHUKOV

25X1

2. WORLD REACTION TO THE SOVIET PURGES  
(page 4).

25X1

3. FOLLOWERS OF FORMER THAI PREMIER PRIDI REPORTED  
IN BURMA

25X1

4. LIBERAL PARTY PLAN TO AMEND KOREAN CONSTITU-  
TION REJECTED BY RHEE

25X1

ANNEX--Conclusions of the Watch Report of the Intelligence  
Advisory Committee

25X1

25X1

25X1

## 1. ELEVATION OF MARSHAL ZHUKOV

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Marshal Georgi Zhukov's promotion to full membership in the Soviet party presidium strengthens the influence of the military and of Zhukov personally.

Zhukov's present standing attests to his support for the economic, political and diplomatic objectives identified with Khrushchev and his victorious faction and indicates that he threw his weight into the scales against the ousted presidium members.

Curtailment of the political police and the growing interdependence of political and military strategy have together resulted in greater military participation in policy-making over the four years since Stalin's death. Also, the new, enlarged presidium is clearly intended to appear as a more broadly-based political body. The elevation of Zhukov, who has been ranking candidate member is, in part, in keeping with this spirit. An additional consideration undoubtedly was Zhukov's immense personal popularity, his high professional prestige, and his apparent amicable working relationship with Khrushchev and Bulganin.

Unlike many of the other new members of the presidium, Zhukov does not owe his rise to purely political patronage and, on his record, he is not likely to be merely a Khrushchev rubber stamp.

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2. WORLD REACTION TO THE SOVIET PURGES (Information as of 2100 EDT, 4 July 57)

Communist leaders and their newspapers on both sides of the iron curtain have commented on the shake-up in the Soviet party presidium with a swiftness that suggests that they may have been briefed beforehand. Sino-Soviet bloc press reaction ranged from genuine enthusiasm in Poland and optimism in Yugoslavia to approving clichés in East Germany. Communist Chinese papers reprinted TASS texts without comment. Initial reactions of officials and newspapers in the free world indicate wide agreement that Khrushchev is consolidating his personal power. The opinion was expressed that the shake-up would lead to a renewed effort by the USSR to sell its policy of conciliation to the non-Communist world.

Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia

The Satellite reaction to the Moscow announcement was instantaneous. With the exception of Albania, all Satellite papers now have published reports on the CPSU central committee meeting and its resolution.

The Rumanian party announced a personnel shuffle of its own. Party first secretary Gheorghiu-Dej may have interpreted the Soviet moves as tacit permission to reform his "collective leadership" too. He fired the leading "Stalinist" member of the politburo, Party Secretary Iosif Chisinevski, and also dismissed from the politburo Miron Constantinescu who retained his post as minister of education. The two men probably have been dragging their feet on implementing Dej's policies which have been in line with the decisions of the 20th Soviet Party Congress.

In Czechoslovakia, where the party's central committee was reported to be preparing an "emergency meeting" for late Friday night, all papers carried the text of the resolution and many reprinted Pravda's 3 June editorial on "Leninist Unity." The home service on 4 July included the resolution in a morning broadcast usually reserved for Rude Pravo's political commentary.

In Poland, the party newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, hailed a return to the spirit of the 20th congress and said that the deposed Stalinists "were closely associated with an epoch... were under the yoke of old ideas... were advocates of old, outworn and useless forms." The paper saw the CPSU's action as a manifestation of "creative Marxism," the spirit which motivates the Chinese and Polish parties. In a warning to dissident hard-line elements in the Polish party, most likely the Natolin group, Trybuna Ludu said that there is no greater internal danger to a Communist party than factions. The paper said these factions should be eliminated and called the Soviet move a "correct policy, a determined struggle against the faction and in defense of the the unity of the party." Warsaw re-broadcast the resolution and accounts of the Moscow party organization meeting throughout the day.

The Bulgarian home service announced the changes and reported Furtseva's address to the Moscow organization. Bulgarian papers carried the full text of Pravda's two editorials.

In East Germany, where the party's central committee was also called into special session, the domestic audience heard a summary of the CPSU resolution and a statement by the Socialist Unity (Communist) Party (SED) in which Ulbricht and other party leaders accused the deposed leaders of "engaging in a slanderous campaign against Comrade Khrushchev." The German leaders said that the new changes merely implemented the decisions of the 20th congress, and intimated that there would be few repercussions in Germany where the SED had consistently applied the lessons of the 20th congress.

The Hungarian press cautioned that the Soviet moves do not foreshadow any relaxation of the campaign against "revisionism"--a warning to party dissidents that the regime's policies are not going to change. A hard-line Nepszabdsag editorial warned: "It may be possible that certain revisionist circles, or circles leaning toward revisionism, will attempt to utilize the present resolution of the CPSU central committee to justify and further their own revisionist leanings and aspirations. It is obvious that the necessary firmness must be displayed against all such manifestations of ideological trouble-making." The Hungarian party endorsed the stand of the CPSU

in a resolution of its own which, it said, would aid "in combating the mistakes of dogmatism or sectarian leanings or methods which persist or are revived."

Yugoslav leaders professed surprise at the Moscow announcement, but Foreign Minister Rankovic commented on it during a speech at a local celebration. He said that the decision of the CPSU "seemed to secure a firmer realization of the line laid down at the 20th congress," and suggested that the error of the deposed Soviet leaders was their failure to "understand the essence of the relations among socialist states." He accused them of attempting to obstruct a rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the USSR, but said that they had failed because of the resolute efforts of Khrushchev. He interpreted the changes as proof of the vitality of Soviet society and prophesied that relations between the two countries would improve as a result.

#### Communist China

Communist China has not yet originated any comment on the purges but broadcast to home audiences the full texts of the 3 July TASS dispatches on the central committee's plenary session and on the resolution adopted by the plenum. Although the Chinese often delay, sometimes for several weeks, in commenting on major bloc developments, an early and favorable comment seems likely in this instance since the Chinese have supported the general line of the 20th Party Congress which the purged leaders are accused of opposing.

#### Free World

Western European newspapers and officials widely accepted the analysis that Khrushchev, with army backing, is consolidating his personal power. Former French premier Mollet stated that Khrushchev "is now sole leader in the Soviet Union." A reported West German government staff study labeled the shuffle "a command decision to return to one-man dictatorship."

European commentators also dwelt upon the possibility of a period of better diplomatic relations between East and West, with various sources suggesting a more conciliatory Soviet line toward disarmament, and a big four meeting on the Middle East. West German Socialist leader Erich Ollenhauer was quoted as saying that the changes in Moscow might be interpreted as an affirmation on the part of the Soviet leaders to continue talks with the West.

The European press reflects a feeling that further changes may come. Former French premier Bidault warned that there is "no reason why the West should contribute naively to the strengthening of the shaken prestige of Russia's present leaders," and Mollet remarked that the "battle between the clans" has perhaps not ended. Mollet added that Communist editors "would do well not to throw too much mud at the 'traitors' on whom they may have to pour flattery tomorrow."

Press and radio in Britain, France and Argentina speculated that the action may be part of a Soviet effort to counter the movement of Communist China toward ideological leadership of the Communist world. The London Times on 4 July editorialized that "one immediate and highly important effect will be that Moscow, by getting rid of the old guard and the ossifiers, will try to regain the doctrinal authority in the Communist world which more and more was being taken over by Peiping."

The British and French Communist parties reacted quickly with authoritative statements on 4 July. A resolution of the French central committee expressed "total agreement" and said that the factional activity merited "denunciation and the most severe disciplinary action." The London Daily Worker editorialized that the USSR was "making it clear to all the world that there will be no return to the wrong methods of the past."

Two Asian heads of state--Prime Minister Nehru and Premier Kishi--commented cautiously on the meaning of the purges. Nehru, who is in London for the Commonwealth Conference, viewed the shifts as part of a historical process in which the Russian revolution was returning to relative normality. He said such a return is "in a healthy direction"



since "the more normality we have the more normal relations tend to become." Kishi observed that "the newcomers" have established themselves in Moscow at the expense of the Stalinists and that as a result, East-West tensions might be lessened "to a certain extent."

**3. FOLLOWERS OF FORMER THAI PREMIER PRIDI  
REPORTED IN BURMA**

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[redacted] six supporters of former Thai premier Pridi are in Burma as guests of the Chinese Communist embassy. Among them is Sanguan Tularak,

[redacted] the former Thai ambassador to Nationalist China, who remained in China after the Communist conquest of the mainland.

**Comment**

It seems unlikely that the Burmese government would have permitted these individuals to come to Rangoon without prior consultation with the Thai government. The Thai exiles may therefore be in Rangoon to negotiate with Thai government agents the conditions under which Pridi might return to Bangkok from his long exile in Communist China.

4. LIBERAL PARTY PLAN TO AMEND KOREAN  
CONSTITUTION REJECTED BY RHEE

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President Rhee has "flatly refused" his party's proposed constitutional amendment which would remove opposition Vice President Chang Myon from the line of presidential succession and

establish a modified parliamentary system of government, according to Ambassador Dowling. Rhee on 3 July explained to a delegation of Liberal assemblymen, including party leader Yi Ki-pung, that the proposed amendment would impinge on his authority as chief of state.

Ambassador Dowling notes that Liberal Party leaders are less certain than Rhee that he will survive the remaining three years of his term, and predicts that they will continue to press Rhee to accept the amendment. The ambassador believes, however, that any amendment Rhee may eventually accept would hardly contain sufficient concessions to counter opposition and public reaction to Chang's elimination as a threat to the Liberal Party.

Comment

The opposition Democratic assemblymen as well as the Liberals would like to see a more parliamentary-type government established. Despite earlier reports that the Democrats would fight to preserve Chang's position, Chang reportedly is amenable to abolishing the vice presidency and placing executive power in a premier's office.

Agreement between Liberal and Democratic assemblymen on the main outlines of the proposed amendment would seem to reduce the probability of an early crisis on this issue.

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**ANNEX**

**Watch Report 361, 3 July 1957  
of the  
Intelligence Advisory Committee**

**Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities**

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral to the Orbit in the immediate future.
- C. Early deliberate initiation of hostilities by Israel or the Arab states is not probable. Although tensions continue between the Arab states and Israel and among certain Arab states themselves, these are not likely to lead to serious conflict in the immediate future.



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